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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (20 Nov 69) FOR OT UT 693012

5 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 124th Transportation Command, Period Ending 31 July 1969

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 124TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TERMINAL A)
APO San Francisco 96312

AVCA CRB-TC-CO

6 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

1. SECTION I - Significant Activities

A. Command Section:

(1) Significant Personnel Assignments: On 5 July 1969 LTC Raymond J. Kostner assumed command of the 10th Transportation Battalion. CPT (CH) John E. Russell assumed the position of Command Chaplain on 19 June 1969. CW3 R. L. Wright was assigned as S1 and assumed the duties of Adjutant on 24 June 1969. CPT Allen N. Yont assumed the position of Provost Marshal on 9 May 1969. CPT Raymond Moot transferred from South Beach Documentation to the Nha Trang Outport on 31 July 1969. CW2 Barry C. Godwin assumed the duty of Harbormaster on 6 July 1969.

(2) Changes in Unit Assignment: On 2 June 1969, administrative control of the J. U. D. Page, was transferred from the 10th Transportation Battalion to Headquarters and Headquarters Company. On 21 July 1969, the 10th Transportation Battalion assumed control of the Phan Rang and Phan Thiet Outports.

(3) Distinguished Visitors:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
LTC Frank T. Mildren	DCG, USARV	1 May 1969
EG Howard H. Cooksey	CoFS Opns, USARV	13 May 1969
EG C. Richardson	Dir of Sup & Trans, Aus Army	16 May 1969

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
COL Sharpe	DCofS SP&O, 1st Log	16 May 1969
COL Lewis	Asst CodS SP&O, 1st Log	16 May 1969
COL Robert J. Keefer	USASUPCOM-CRB	30 May 1969
BG Albert E. Hunter	CG Designate, USASUPCOM-QN	5 June 1969
BG Maurice J. Halper	Comptroller, USARPAC	9 June 1969
COL Warren G. Amburn	USATSCH	9 June 1969
COL Paul D. Hickman	USAOC&S	9 June 1969
COL Kenneth L. Stahl	IG Designate, 1st Log	11 June 1969
BG K. Colwell	CofS, Southern Command Melbourne, Australia	23 June 1969
Mr. W. Lee Hughey	1st Log	1 July 1969
COL Woods	1st Log	1 July 1969
COL Gleason	USASUPCOM-CRB	1 July 1969
MG Russ	DCG, IFFV	2 July 1969
Mr. Clyde Hardin	Office of the Asst Secretary of the Army, R&D	8 July 1969
COL George D. Stryer	DC Designate, USASUPCOM-QN	10 July 1969
COL T. O'Donnell	Dep G-4, USARV	12 July 1969

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B. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline:

(1) Promotions made in the command:

TO: CPT 1LT CW2 E2 E7 E5 E4 E3 E2
7 4 4 1 3 45 105 173 3

(2) The following awards were recommended and received:

MAY 1969

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Received</u>
Legion of Merit	2	1
Bronze Star	26	13
ARCOM	64	13
ARCOM V	0	0
Certificate of Achievement	1	0
Purple Heart	0	0

JUNE 1969

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Received</u>
Legion of Merit	1	0
Bronze Star	20	40
ARCOM	37	54
ARCOM V	0	2
Certificate of Achievement	0	0
Purple Heart	0	0

JULY 1969

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Received</u>
Legion of Merit	1	1
Bronze Star	16	29
ARCOM	39	36
ARCOM V	0	0
Certificate of Achievement	0	0
Purple Heart	0	0

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6 August 1969

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(3) Disciplinary and judiciary actions: The following actions occurred or were completed during the reporting period:

(a) Crimes against persons or property - 4

(b) Miscellaneous and military offenses - 25

(c) Traffic offenses - 44

(d) Article 15's - 130

(e) Summary Court Martials - 1

(f) Special Court Martials - 13

(g) General Court Martials - 0

(h) The three most common offenses are: SPEEDING, OTHER TRAFFIC OFFENSES, AND POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA.

(4) Public Information Activities: During the months of May, June, and July 119, 95, and 36 Hometown News Releases were submitted, respectively, for a quarterly total of 252.

(5) RAR:

MONTH	ALLOCATED	UTILIZED
May	115	96
June	89	68
July	85	83

For the most part, the majority of allocations have been utilized with few turnbacks. Allocations for Hawaii hit a low of 17 for July but an increase is anticipated in August to compensate for this low.

(6) Safety:

(a) Total number of initial accident reports: 29

(b) Total number of reportable accidents by type:

(1) Personal injury - 16

(2) Motor Vehicle - 7

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(3) Fatalities - 0

(4) Local National - 3

(5) Property damage - 3

(c) Mileage and manhours:

(1) May - 250,827 mi - 32,286 manhrs

(2) June - 230,869 mi - 33,013 manhrs

(3) July - 214,825 mi - 31,335 manhrs

(d) The most common accidents were personal injuries and motor vehicle accidents. Twenty of the 29 accidents occurred in the month of July alone.

(7) Reenlistment Program:

(a) May

1. RA 1st Term Eligible - 6 Enl - 1 Per Cent 16.6%

2. Career Reenlist Eligible - 3 Enl - 3 Per Cent 100%

3. AUS Eligible - 7 Enl - 0 Per Cent 0%

4. TOTAL: Eligible - 16 Enl - 4 Per Cent 25%

(b) June

1. RA 1st Term Eligible - 0 Enl - 0 Per Cent N/A

2. Career Reenlist Eligible - 2 Enl - 2 Per Cent 100%

3. AUS Eligible - 0 Enl - 0 Per Cent N/A

4. TOTAL Eligible - 2 Enl - 2 Per Cent 100%

(c) July

1. RA 1st Term Eligible - 3 Enl - 3 Per Cent 100%

2. Career Reenlist Eligible - 5 Enl - 5 Per Cent 100%

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3. AUS Eligible - 1 Enl - 1 Per Cent 100%

4. TOTAL Eligible - 9 Enl - 9 Per Cent 100%

(8) Extensions of Foreign Service Tour executed during this quarter were as follows:

(a) Under 90 days: 74

(b) Six months: 42

(9) Billeting and Mess:

(a) During the quarter, the EM billets' interiors were completed with the installation and painting of ceilings and partitions.

(b) All personnel bunkers and blast walls were reconstructed with lumber to correct the deterioration of sandbags used in construction of the original bunkers.

(c) For the months of June and July the HHC Mess Hall was awarded the Support Command Four Star Plaque Award for overall excellence. HHC Mess Hall was also named the outstanding 124th Transportation Command Mess facility for the month of July.

(10) Vehicle Use:

The age of the vehicles within this unit together with the excessive wear and tear resulting from the high mileage rate and the terrain and climate conditions causes the higher than normal deadline rate. The Motor Pool has a strongly emphasized preventive maintenance program requiring daily driver maintenance. All vehicles are checked on rack for leaks and loose bolts impairing the combat serviceability of the vehicle. Every 14 days all vehicles are subjected to a Technical Inspection to discover deficiencies and short comings and also as a means of updating log books and PLL.

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C. Operations:

(1) Deep Draft:

(a) Deep draft tonnage handled by the Cam Ranh Bay Complex for the months of May, June and July was 411,416 short tons. This compares with 365,037 handled during the preceding quarter.

(b) Tonnage handled by Cam Ranh Bay Port for the months of May, June and July was 127,290 short tons, 143,808 short tons, and 167,139 short tons respectively; for the outports, monthly tonnage handled was 4,101 short tons, 12,118 short tons, and 7,010 short tons respectively.

(c) During this quarter, deep draft turnaround time continued to be low; 3.1 days per vessel in May, 2.9 days in June, and 2.1 days in July.

(2) Shallow Draft:

(a) Shallow draft tonnage handled by the Cam Ranh Bay Complex for the months of May, June and July was 290,737 short tons. This compares with 281,341 short tons handled during the preceding quarter.

(b) Tonnage handled by Cam Ranh Bay Port for the months of May, June and July was 71,982 short tons, 60,602 short tons, and 44,508 short tons respectively; for the outports, monthly tonnage handled was 41,977 short tons, 33,597 short tons, and 38,071 short tons respectively.

(3) Highway: Totals of 187,517 short tons, 183,776 short tons, and 212,178 short tons were hauled in highway operations during May, June and July respectively. This includes 192,038 short tons handled by Sea Land and 80,600 short tons handled by Alaska Barge and Transport. This is a grand total of 583,471 short tons. There is an increase of 39,306 short tons from the last reporting period. The increase is due to growing Sea Land and Alaska Barge and Transport operations. Sea Land increased 29,197 short tons during this period; Alaska Barge and Transport was up 24,036 short tons. The tonnage cleared by military units was down 23,919 short tons. Lower military tonnage is significant in the fact that it reflects the loss of capability incurred by non-availability of drivers (due to driver shortage, an average of 52 vehicles per month sat idle in the 24th Transportation Battalion).

(4) Rail: Rail activity was limited due to the recurring problems of

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lack of cars, lack of rail compatible cargo and refusal of many consignees to accept cargo by rail. Tonnages were as follows: 143 short tons for May; 135 short tons for June; and 200 short tons for July.

(5) Documentation Trends:

(a) Outturn Reports: 1. Deep Draft Section: During the period 1 May thru 31 July 1969, 136 outturn reports have been completed. As of 1 August 1969, the working level of reports to be completed stands at 15. Also during the above period there were no outturn reports due beyond the sixty day regulatory time required by MILSTAMP.

2. Shallow Draft Section: During the period 1 May thru 31 July 1969, 149 outturn reports have been completed. As of 1 August 1969, the working level of reports to be completed stands at 0. Also during the above period, there were no outturn reports due beyond the sixty day regulatory time period required by MILSTAMP.

(b) Reconciliation: TCMD reconciliation rate has risen from a past low of 40% to a present high of 98% as of 31 July 1969. Monthly reconciliation rates for the quarter were:

30 May - 97%

30 Jun - 97.4%

31 Jul - 98%

These high rates were brought about by aggressive follow-up action consisting of telephone and written requests, liaison visits, and classes given to consignees and contractors.

(6) Documentation Training:

(a) The safeguarding and security of military cargo is to a large extent dependent on proper documentation methods and related procedures. Because of the serious consequences that pilfered cargo in the Black Market can have on the overall economy of a struggling country, the importance of documentation cannot be overstated. Also, because documentation and its related methods and procedures are regulated by a host of joint and involved regulations, training in this field prior to an individual assuming a documentation position is mandatory.

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(b) Most problems in the above area have not been in receiving non-qualified personnel, but in the receiving of too few qualified personnel to fill documentation authorization of this headquarters. Trained documentation personnel earmarked for this headquarters have been drained off prior to arrival causing a serious shortage in our supervisory pier checker section. These supervisory personnel generally would insure that adequate accountability of offloaded cargo is maintained by contract stevedores and make sure that proper truck loading procedures are enforced. Cargo accountability under contracts operating with non-US labor is unenforceable unless military supervisory personnel are present to protect and insure the interests of the United States Government.

(c) At present, six out of twenty-eight men authorized as supervisory checkers have been received causing a serious gap in cargo security. In order to alleviate this problem, a documentation school as an alternative has been established at Cam Ranh Bay where Vietnamese and third country nationals are presently receiving instructions on cargo accounting procedures.

(d) The Port Documentation School was formally opened on 11 July 1969. The overall mission of the school is to develop and train local nationals in occupational and job specialties in cargo accounting which will play a vital role in the future development of the port of Cam Ranh Bay and ultimately the national economy of the Republic of Vietnam. The school itself was constructed and is being staffed and administered by members of the Port Documentation Branch.

(e) Total number of classes given during the quarter was 35. Of this number, 19 were given at our Port Documentation School.

(7) Documentation Personnel Situation:

(a) During the past quarter the Documentation Branch has been operating well below its authorized strength level. Monthly strength levels for the quarter were:

May - 50%

June - 50%

July - 58%

(b) In order to operate within the limits of normal efficiency and effectiveness, 100% of the authorized strength level must be reached and

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maintained. If not, the supervision necessary for each pier to protect US Government cargo will be ineffective and serious losses will accrue to the government.

(8) Publications: Educational packets containing guidance regulations and technical data have been printed and issued on a monthly basis for the reporting period to outports, contractors, military stevedores and truck units, and to consignees. Some of the printed material developed and distributed during this period included:

124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) Regulation 55-22, Reporting Discrepancies Incident to the Discharge of Cargo from a Vessel, dated 24 July 1969.

SOP, Liaison 14th Aerial Port (Cam Ranh Bay), dated 19 July 1969.

SOP, Inspection Section Port Documentation, dated 21 July 1969.

SOP, Shallow Draft Documentation, dated 9 July 1969.

SOP, Alaska Barge and Transport Documentation, dated 21 July 1969.

SOP, Overstow Documentation, dated 29 July 1969.

SOP, Documentation of Barges, dated 22 July 1969.

(9) Construction Program: During the reporting period, the following construction was accomplished on a self-help basis by the members of the Documentation Branch:

Painting of building exterior.

Construction of seven offices.

Construction of large school area to include classroom and administrative area.

Installation of large exhaust fan.

Installation of florescent lights and flood lights.

Also during this period, a water trailer, refrigerator, and new latrine have

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been secured. These improvements have brought about better than average working conditions for the members of the Documentation Branch; as a result, the morale has improved and quality and quantity of work has increased.

(10) Purchase and Contract:

(a) The following contracts are presently in force:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Contractor</u>	<u>Type</u>
DAJB 11-70-C-0007	Nguyen Van An	Ferry Service
DAJB 11-69-C-0048	Luzon Stevedoring Corp	Tug Boats
DAJB 11-70-C-0006	Vinnell Corp	Stevedoring
DAJB 11-69-D-0023	Lam Brothers Corp	Stevedoring
DAJB 11-69-C-0163	Hiep Thang	Tug Boats
DAJB 11-70-A-0720	Kilaco Co	Potable Water

(b) The Lam Brothers Corp contracts of fiscal year 1969 was extended pending award of a final contract for fiscal year 1970,

(c) The master and crew of the LT 1940, operated by Hiep Thang, were relieved of duty on 21 July 1969. The tug collided with and damaged two vessels in a period of four days. A new master is expected; he will be tested before being allowed to handle vessels.

(d) Contract DAJB 11-70-C-0043, for the operation of a 100 ton floating crane (BD 6658) was cancelled because the crane arrived in a nonoperational state.

(e) The ferry company requested dry docking facilities to accomplish necessary hull repairs, efforts are in the process to obtain docking space.

(f) A complaint was made to the US Army Procurement Agency concerning Lam Brothers failure to react with reasonable speed to provide water when called upon to do so.

(g) An SOP was jointly developed with S2, S3, and Port Documentation concerning monitoring of stevedoring operations.

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(11) Security:

(a) During this reporting period the amount of pilferage accredited to Cam Ranh Bay continued to decline. This decrease is attributed to increased command emphasis on reduction of pilferage and greater security consciousness of guard and supervisory personnel.

(b) The semi-annual physical security inspection based on LC Reg 525-2 was conducted for this command on 23 and 24 July 1969. The physical security aspect of the inspection reflected a significant improvement in all areas during the past six months. Especially noteworthy was the alertness and performance of the gate guards.

(c) On 15 July a consolidated guard roster system went into effect under the control of the 191st Ord Bn. Under this system each command in CRB contributed a number of guards on a daily basis in proportion to the number of assigned personnel. The requirement for gate and hatch guards remained with the 10th Trans Bn.

(d) The consolidated guard roster system did not prove to be beneficial to this command. There was no significant reduction in the number of personnel required for guard duty; administrative and messing problems were staggering and the loss of control and flexibility over the guards in key positions around the port greatly decreased the effectiveness of the port security. On 22 July 1969 the 124th Trans Comd withdrew its support of the consolidated guard system and the 10th Trans Bn resumed responsibility for providing port security.

(e) Several incidents at Pier 3 between gate guards of this command and RVN navy personnel from the RVNNTC resulted in misunderstanding and friction between the personnel involved.

(f) To avoid future incidents, a guard from RVNNTC was placed on duty at the entrance to Pier 3 to check out all RVN navy personnel entering and leaving the port area.

(12) Activities at Nha Trang Outport:

(a) During the period of 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, the Nha Trang Outport discharged a total of 43,068 short tons and 129,199 measurable tons of cargo while it outloaded 39,990 short tons and 143,848 measurable tons. This is divided between the months as follows:

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<u>MAY</u>		<u>JUNE</u>		<u>JULY</u>	
<u>D/C</u>	<u>O/L</u>	<u>D/C</u>	<u>O/L</u>	<u>D/C</u>	<u>O/L</u>
S/T 9,713	15,165	20,492	10,947	12,863	13,878
M/T 29,139	45,495	61,476	32,841	38,584	65,512

(b) This cargo was discharged and outloaded in 25 deep draft vessels, 97 shallow draft vessels and 40 barges. The monthly breakdown is as follows:

<u>MAY</u>		
<u>Number</u>	<u>D/C</u>	<u>O/L</u>
Deep Draft 8	3,585	636
LST 10	2,219	1,498
LCU 20	1,743	12,866
BC 11	2,166	165
Total: 9,713 S/T		+ S/T 15,165 = 24,878 S/T

Cumulative Total:

<u>JUNE</u>		
<u>Number</u>	<u>D/C</u>	<u>O/L</u>
Deep Draft 9	11,779	339
LST 10	1,397	464
LCU 16	1,484	9,831
BC 16	5,832	313
Total: 20,492 S/T		+ S/T 10,497 = 31,439

Cumulative Total:

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	<u>Number</u>	<u>JULY</u> <u>D/C</u>	<u>O/L</u>	
Deep Draft	8	6,129	879	
LST	12	1,916	2,390	
LCU	29	2,979	9,685	
BC	13	<u>1,839</u>	<u>964</u>	Cumulative Total:
		Total: 12,863 S/T + S/T 13,878		= 26,741

(c) A total of 5258 ROKA troops were embarked and 4976 were debarked during the quarter. The monthly figures, including number of troop ship, are as follows:

May: Two ships, 1296 troops were embarked and 1291 were debarked.

June: Three ships, 1690 troops were embarked and 1836 were debarked.

July: Three ships, 2262 troops were embarked and 1849 were debarked.

(d) On 19 June 1969, the Nha Trang Outport facilities were inspected by LTC Shannon from 1st Logistical Command and Major Sands from USARV. On 19 June 1969, Colonel Gleason, Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, CRB, made an unannounced visit to Nha Trang Outport and found everything satisfactory. On 18 July 1969, Colonel Del Mar, Commanding Officer, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A), CRB, visited the Nha Trang Outport and inspected LCU 1359. There were no other significant visitors in the Nha Trang Outport.

(e) There were two mortar attacks during the quarter. One on 12 May 1969, and one on 31 May 1969 which hit the Air Base and 8th Field Hospital. Neither affected the Outport operation.

(f) An upgrading of security defense around Nha Trang occurred during the quarter.

(g) Personnel: During the quarter the two detachments, 603d and 611th, have been operating at approximately 70 to 75% strength. In August they will be operating at about 75% strength.

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(h) Utilization of Civilian Contractors: The civilian contractors at the Nha Trang Outport are performing at approximately 10% above their normal capacity. If the cargo receiving capability of various consignees, notably USAID, ARVN, and US Air Force could be increased, the utilization of AB&T would be increased between 25% to 40%.

(13) Activities at Phan Rang Outport:

(a) The Phan Rang Outport, documented by the 613th Transportation Detachment with discharging carried out by Pacific Alaska Columbia Inc., discharged the following amounts for the quarter beginning 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969.

<u>Month</u>	<u>S/T Discharged</u>	<u>Barges Discharged</u>	<u>LST's Discharged</u>
May	14,941	56	17
June	8,369	1	15
July	12,811	43	18
TOTAL	36,121	100	50

(LST's discharged includes LCU's, LSM's and JUD Page)

(b) During the quarter covering 1 May to 31 July 1969 the biggest problem concerning documentation and operation of the outport has been the inaccurate manifests received with cargo from Cam Ranh Bay. Approximately 85 per cent of all manifests received, including ammunition and general cargo, are inaccurate. This creates such discrepancies as destination of cargo, number and amount awaiting clearance through the port.

(c) During the month of June, LARC V patrols were started and guards have been placed on barges secured to buoys during the hours of darkness. These security measures have succeeded in stopping all pilferage during this reporting period. Better security could be provided by some type of Naval patrol vessel, rather than a US Army LARC V.

(d) Highway security for the AB&T trucks is non-existent at the present time, as indicated on the attack on AB&T trucks on the 21 May 1969 and on 19 June 1969. This attack shows that the enemy would have an easy time in ambushing these trucks. There has been a decrease in sabotage against the POL

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Pipe Line during this period.

(e) During June the rate of discharge was lower than the normal capacity requirements. This was due to the fact that little cargo was destined for this port.

(f) During the month of July the road from the beach to the air base was completely asphalted. Truck travel time has been cut by 15 minutes one way. Flat tire rate on the trucks has been cut from five a day to less than one a day.

(g) During the month of June, one Lorain 56, 2-ton crane was replaced by a Lorain 86, 4-ton crane. Three Hyster 15 forklifts have been added. These forklifts have low lifting capacity and due to the narrow tire, they can not operate on the sand ramps which makes them of little use for unloading LST's or LCU's.

(h) A check team of 1 Lt., 1 E-6, 2 E-5, 3 E-4, and 3 E-3 is the required number of personnel for port documentation. At present there is only 1 E-5 and 2 E-4s at Phan Rang. The work can be handled easily by a force of 2 E-5s and 4 E-4s.

(i) The outport was not a target of any enemy action during this reporting period.

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2. SECTION II - Lessons Learned

A. Operations.

(1) Reducing Vessel Turnaround Time:

1. Observation: A primary factor in decreasing deep draft turnaround time is a steady flow of cargo from the piers.

2. Evaluation: The use of staging areas greatly expedites the maintenance of this controlled cargo movement. By using a staging area adjacent to the piers to hold cargo in excess of the consignee's ability to receive, the pier itself is kept free of congestion. Excessive idle hook time is eliminated and the ship's discharge is completed rapidly. The staging of cargo to be outloaded insures the rapid availability of such cargo.

3. Recommendation: Further reductions in turnaround time could be realized by construction of additional staging areas and the improvement of existing ones, such as the staging area between Piers 2 & 3, which should be leveled and asphalted. A Military Construction Army (MCA) request for additional hardstand areas was submitted 12 January 1969; presently, we are forwarding additional justification for this request.

(2) Problems Hindering Rail Operations:

1. Observation: Rail tonnage remains low due to the following reasons:

a. Lack of rail compatible cargo.

b. Refusal of consignees to accept rail cargo.

c. Slow return of rolling stock.

2. Evaluation: In order to achieve a viable rail operation certain conditions must be met. Cargo must be identified as rail compatible as soon as possible. Consignees must accept shipments via rail; albeit truck shipments are more convenient to them. Rolling stock must be promptly returned.

3. Recommendation: The lesson learned is that a sound rail system is the result of cooperation between shippers and receivers. Cargo must be consigned to rail and the receiver must make an attempt to receive this cargo. For the rail system to function properly, with the cooperation of all involved, high level command emphasis is needed.

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(3) Driver Shortage in the 24th Transportation Battalion:

1. Observation: The shortage of qualified drivers has become an increasing problem. The average number of vehicles without drivers runs approximately 52 per day.

2. Evaluation: Due to the shortage of drivers, many ton miles per month are lost. Provided that all vehicles had drivers, operating efficiency could be increased at least 15 percent. Non-availability of drivers, therefore, reduces the overall efficiency of the port by increasing turnaround time and decreasing the rate at which stevedore gangs may offload a vessel.

3. Recommendation: Terminal units engaged in port and beach clearance operations work a twenty-four hour day. This 24-hour operation requires 2 drivers per vehicle; thus, such units must be up to full TO&E strength.

(4) Shallow Draft Operations:

1. Observation: Beach operations involving shallow draft vessels are greatly affected by the flow of the tide. Time lost when the tide is out and an LST cannot come on a ramp delays both discharge and outload operations. A vessel such as the LST has an operating expense of approximately \$1200 per day.

2. Evaluation:

a. Shallow draft operations were greatly enhanced by the use of locally fabricated portable ramps in the outloading and discharge of LSTs. To minimize time lost awaiting high tide, portable ramps are used to bridge the gap between the beach and the ramp on the LST. The portable ramp used at Cam Ranh Bay is of thirty foot dual expansion construction with twenty foot body and two five foot end flaps. The use of these ramps almost completely eliminates the need for LST operations to be subject to tidal conditions.

b. Operations requiring oversized or heavy lift cargo created many delays in completing vessel discharge or outload. Prior to construction of another specialized portable ramp, this operation was achieved by discharging the tank deck of the vessel and shifting to a finger pier for completion of the weather deck. This operation caused a possible twenty-four hour delay before the vessel could be completed. With the construction of a thirty foot slanted ramp and berthing on the finger pier, operations could simultaneously take place in the tank deck and on the weather deck of the vessel. Maximum utilization of portable ramps has also proven to be quite

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effective in the discharge of tedious cargo such as asphalt. Previous operations handling asphalt required almost ninety hours to complete a discharge. Maximum cargo that could be handled was five drums of asphalt every five minutes. This is accomplished by working through the hatch of the LST with a crane rigged with two sets of barrel chimes handling ten drums, and forklifts working through the tank deck handling five drums of asphalt.

2. Recommendation: Maximum utilization of portable ramps can effectively reduce the time required for cargo operations on LSTs.

(5) Priority 1 Cargo Moved by LCUs and the BDL Page:

1. Observation: During the months of June and July, it was noted that an increasing amount of cargo with transportation priority 1 has been offered for movement on this command's organic vessel assets. Due to this command's extreme flexibility and rapid reaction time, we were able to move this cargo by water within the specified transportation segment of the Order Ship Time (OST).

2. Evaluation: This command has always moved transportation priority 1 cargo to Nha Trang and Phan Rang. The short distances involved make it impractical and needlessly expensive to use air transportation. However, this command is presently receiving priority 1 cargo for Phan Thiet, mainly repair parts and ammunition, for shipment on its organic vessels. The transportation segment of the Order Ship Time (OST) is four days for priority 1 cargo, often making it necessary to load this cargo on a vessel on a "Short Fuse" basis to insure that it reaches its destination within four days. This command was informed by the Support Command Movement Control Center that transportation priority 1 Phan Thiet cargo was offered to this command instead of the Traffic Management Agency Airlift Section because the Air Force was not as responsive to transportation requirements as this command.

3. Recommendation: That transportation priority 1 cargo to distant destinations be offered this command only after the preferred mode of transportation, viz, the Air Force, has proved unavailable or impractical.

(6) Effective Utilization of Barges:

1. Observation: The increased utilization of barges as lighterage has reaped unusually high dividends.

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2. Evaluation: Barge tonnage hit an all time high in June 1969 with 29,392 short tons moved. The use of barges to relieve trucks from RMK delivery expedited vessel turnaround time. Delivery to RMK-BRJ is an extremely long turnaround for trucks; moreover, RMK-BRJ has a barge pier which had never been fully utilized.

3. Recommendation: Barge utilization freed more trucks for use in port and beach operations.

(7) Manifesting Shallow Draft Vessels:

1. Observation: At various times in the past it was necessary to manifest the BDL Page, which was docked a distance of three miles from the documentation facility. As a result, error, miscalculations, and untimely manifest completion caused the BDL to delay sailing until manifest completion.

2. Evaluation: In order to expedite sailing of the Page, upon completion of loading, a documentation individual was sent to do manifesting aboard vessel. Typewriter and adding machine were provided. This resulted in the elimination of TCMD truck pickup and delivery to the documentation facility and delivery of manifest to vessel since all this was done aboard the vessel by documentation personnel.

(8) South Beach Ammunition Operations:

1. Observation: The waiver of Quantity-Distance Safety Standards for Cam Ranh Bay's shallow draft vessel operating site (South Beach) was disapproved in April, with ammunition operations to terminate by 1 September 1969.

2. Evaluation: In order to continue efficient shallow draft ammunition operations after 1 September 1969, it has been necessary to request that Alaska Barge & Transport Corporation move a part of their operations to the North Beach area near Pier 5, the deep draft ammunition pier. The Alaska Barge & Transport Corporation capability is required because other resources are not available to handle ammunition for shallow draft vessels at North Beach.

3. Recommendation: That the request to shift a portion of the Alaska Barge & Transport Corporation capability to the North Beach area adjacent to the DeLong ammunition pier (Pier 5) be approved.

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(9) Milvan Pilot Program:

1. Observation: As the MILVAN pilot program nears, no additional personnel or facilities have been provided to this command.

2. Evaluation: In order for the pilot program to be a success, an area manned by sufficient and competent personnel must be completed. Sufficient people for the MILVAN pilot program must include a medium truck platoon with officer and the following augmentation:

1 Motor maintenance SGT	E-5	MOS 63C40
1 general vehicle repairman	E-5	MOS 63C30
1 wheeled vehicle repairman	E-4	MOS 63B20
2 mechanical maintenance apprentices	E-3	MOS 63A10
2 refrigeration specialists	E-4	MOS 51L20
2 senior movements specialists	E-5	MOS 71N20
4 movements specialists	E-4	MOS 71N20
1 automotive repair parts specialist	E-5	MOS 76S20
1 representative from MCC		

Additional equipment needed includes:

- 1 M37, 3/4 ton truck
- 1 M51A1, 1/4 ton truck
- 3 ANGR-46 radios
- 1 power pack for ANGR-46
- 1 antenna set
- 7 automotive mechanics tool sets
- 1 second echelon (D.S.) tool kit
- 1 steam cleaner

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2 typewriters

1 Date-Time stamp (electric)

As for facilities, a hard stand suitable for the processing and parking of MILVAN trailers is required prior to the pilot program. The MILVAN area should include a fenced-in area with:

MCC (Milvan Control Center)

Maintenance facilities

Wash racks

3. Recommendation: That action be taken at all levels to expedite preparations for MILVAN operations. The MILVAN area must be provided along with the personnel and equipment described in the evaluation. If sufficient personnel, equipment and areas are not completed before the pilot program, MILVAN will not receive a fair test.

(10) Cargo Discrepancy Reporting:

1. Observation: In the past, there was not a systematic method of communicating information about stevedore operations. Therefore, when a stevedore's employees were guilty of pilferage or negligence, or failed to perform with reasonable efficiency, the incident was not brought to the attention of the contracting officer. This meant that the contracting officer was totally uninformed about a stevedore's ability to do a good job when it came time to award a new contract. Also, the contracting officer was not able to order remedial action during the term of the contract.

2. Recommendations: All personnel in this command should thoroughly familiarize themselves with 124th Transportation Command (Tml A) Reg 55-22, dated 24 July 1969, concerning "Reporting Discrepancies Incident to the Discharge of Cargo from a Vessel."

(11) Port Performance Analysis:

1. Observation: The 124th Transportation Command (Tml A) instituted a formal system of port performance analysis on 1 June 1969. The purpose of the analysis is to provide detailed information on each vessel which is worked at Cam Ranh Bay so that the performance of each stevedore contractor and military terminal service unit can be compared, recurring problems and trends can be identified, and refinements in port operations can be developed.

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2. Evaluation: This performance analysis technique has provided a means of systematically documenting the many problems which this port faces in daily operations. Ironically, these problems are not new; they have been hampering efficient operations since the port of Cam Ranh Bay was established.

a. One of the more vexing problems we face at Cam Ranh Bay is difficulty in obtaining accurate forecasts of vessel arrivals. Stevedore gangs are committed on the projected arrival of a vessel; when the vessel does not arrive as anticipated, human resources, our most critical asset, are wasted. The problem becomes particularly acute in trying to properly plan for Shipping Agreement vessels. According to MSTs, these vessels, where only a given amount of cargo space is chartered, are not required to give position reports as they proceed toward the receiving port; consequently, it is not uncommon to have these vessels arrive with little or no advance information. It would seem that in this day of sophisticated communications capability, procedures could be established to accurately monitor the exact status and location of cargo vessels at all times. Further, it would seem both prudent and economical to include a provision in Shipping Agreement contracts to require periodic position reporting so that firm and dependable arrival times can be established.

b. Outloading ports in CONUS use gantry cranes to literally "drop" heavy lifts into every hatch on a vessel regardless of the capability of the ship's gear and oblivious to the fact that a port such as Cam Ranh Bay has only one over-worked 100 ton floating crane available for heavy lifts. The lack of realistic planning at CONUS outloading ports is further illustrated by situations here at Cam Ranh Bay where heavy lift ships loaded with general cargo have been working on one side of a pier while general cargo ships loaded with heavy lifts have been discharging on the opposite side of the same pier.

c. Here in 1969, it is common knowledge that the channel leading to the ammunition pier at Cam Ranh Bay will accommodate a vessel with a maximum draft of 27 feet. Yet, vessels continue to arrive with Cam Ranh Bay as their first port of discharge with drafts as much as 33 feet. The result is a relatively inefficient stream discharge operation, even when pier space is available.

d. Advance information on cargo destined for this port (i.e. stow plans and manifests) normally arrive from CONUS ports in ample time for proper planning to be accomplished. The only exception is in the case of ships which are diverted after they are enroute to Vietnam. Advance information is normally not available, however, on shipments between ports

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in Vietnam. In those situations where another port in Vietnam has back-loaded a vessel for Cam Ranh Bay, the ship invariably arrives in advance of any type of documentation. This makes proper planning completely impossible. As a result, port clearance requirements can not be programmed and consignees can not be notified to prepare for the receipt of cargo. Investigation into this problem has revealed that the ships move more rapidly than cargo traffic messages. This problem could be overcome by installing direct teletype circuits between each major port in the country. When it is considered that the cost of a vessel runs from \$4000 to \$8000 per day, and that lack of advance information on a vessel invariably costs at least one-half day delay, adequate inter-port communication would save money rather than resulting in additional cost to the government.

e. Reefer Cargo: In this day of modern technology, cargo arriving aboard the obsolete reefer ships must be handled as it was in the horse and buggy era. The losses and delays resulting in not being able to maintain sufficiently low temperatures while the ships are working is staggering. Reefer cargo is not palletized; consequently, each box and crate must be individually handled by stevedores discharging the vessel, the warehousemen receiving the cargo at the depot, and by others in the distribution chain. As a result, reefer ship discharge at Cam Ranh Bay rarely exceeds an average of 200 S/T per day. If reefer cargo were palletized so that it could be handled with conventional MHE, ship discharge and warehousing rates could be increased threefold with resulting savings in manpower and vessel charter fees. In addition, increased availability of Sealand refrigerated containers would also avoid all of the port handling which now characterizes reefer discharge operations.

f. A major portion of the sensitive PX cargo such as cameras and electronic equipment is poorly boxed and packaged, thus inviting pilferage at loading, intransit, and discharge ports. It has been recommended that CONEX containers and other security type containers be used for this sensitive cargo. At the present time, some PX cargo is shipped in by Sealand containers; however, the great bulk of the cargo continues to arrive in flimsy wooden crates and cardboard covered pallets readily susceptible to pilferage.

g. CONUS outloading ports use highly sophisticated materials handling equipment to obtain very tight and close stow of cargo on vessels. Stevedores in Vietnam are severely handicapped and discharge is slowed immensely since only conventional MHE is available to remove this cargo. Recent examples include stowing a layer of pallets on its side so that this layer would be below the hatch combing, and stowing crates of firebombs with side-shifters and boom miles. In both cases, discharge was delayed and cargo was damaged as it was necessary to snake it out of the hatch using ship's gear. It would appear appropriate to establish policies at CONUS outloading ports which insure that loading is accomplished in a fashion which will permit expeditious discharge with conventional MHE.

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1. Recommendation: A system of performance analysis, by vessel worked, to document recurring problem areas and to identify operating trends is commended for use at other ports. In addition, if adopted, the solutions suggested to the problems identified in the preceding evaluation will significantly improve port operating efficiency.

B. Maintenance:

(1) Electric Forklift Downtime:

1. Observation: That an excessive amount of downtime encountered on electric forklifts was due primarily to low voltage causing arcing across relay contacts resulting in burned contact points, malfunctioning of relays and other electrical components. The previous practice of limiting the time that an operator would be allowed to operate an electric forklift before changing batteries for recharging had not proved satisfactory.

2. Recommendation: That a voltmeter indicator with a scale from 0-50 volts with a minimum indicator line of 29 volts be installed on each electric forklift so as to warn the operator that the minimum allowable operating voltage had been reached.

(2) Out-of-Country Repair:

1. Observation: That the Out-of-Country Repair Program for marine floating craft has been unsatisfactory. Vessels wait inordinate lengths of time to be towed to the repair facility, wait to be scheduled, wait for the work, and wait for return tow. The work is often unsatisfactory.

2. Recommendation: Broaden the scope of the in-country contracts (Vinnell and AB&T) to decrease the time a vessel is deadlined for maintenance and thereby the quality of equipment available to this command. If vessels must leave country to foreign yards, a control team of no less than two Marine Engineers could visit the yards from the owning organization or command report directly to the commander the progress, delays, etc. on the vessels.

1 Incl - wd, HQ, DA
~~Organization Diagram~~

H. R. DEL MAR
Colonel, TC
Commanding

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6 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65)(RI)

DISTRIBUTION:

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3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
4-CG, 1st Log Comd, ATTN: AVCA GO-O
7-CO, USASUPCOM-CRB, ATTN: AVCA CRB-CO

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AVCA CIB-GO-O (6 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 124th Transportation Command (TML A)
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, Headquarters US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312 27 AUG 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-O, APO
96384

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters 124th Transportation Command (TML A) for the period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.


2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, paragraph A(5): Nonconcur: The transportation segment of the order ship time is 3 days for priority 1 shipments not 4 days (ref LC Reg 55-40 para 5 (g)). Priority 1 cargo to end stations within this command's AOR is shipped by Army controlled assets (highway and watercraft) whenever possible in accordance with LC Reg 55-40 Appendix A para C (3)d.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph A(9): The MILVAN pilot program has been postponed indefinitely by 1st Log Command. Sufficient time will be given before resumption of the program to allow facilities to be completed.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. This report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


LEE W. SHERRILL
1 LT, AGC
ASST AG

CF: 124th Trans Comd (TML A)

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AWCA GO-MH (6 Aug 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 15 OCT 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 124th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Reducing Vessel Turnaround Time, page 18, paragraph A(1). The additional justification for the hardstand area is being forwarded by Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

b. Reference item concerning Driver Shortage, page 19, paragraph A(3). Nonconcur. As of 31 July 1969 this command was assigned 84.4% of its authorized strength in MOS 64A and 64B. To concur with this comment would mean that other units authorized drivers would be tasked to absorb this continuing shortage of drivers.

c. Reference item concerning Shallow Draft Operations, page 19, paragraph A(4). Concur. The 124th Trans Comd should initiate request for construction to obtain the desired LST ramp at the finger pier.

d. Reference item concerning Priority 1 Cargo Moved by ICU's and the BDL Page. Nonconcur with 1st Indorsement stating the transportation segment of the order ship time is 3 days for priority 1 shipments, UNCLAS cite 9037, this headquarters, dated 18 June 1969, changed the standard for priority 1 shipments to 4 days. 1st Indorsement comment concerning use of Army controlled assets where possible is in accordance with IC Reg 55-40, Appendix A, paragraph C(3)b. If RDD can be met by organic transportation, this should be used as a transportation savings and to provide greater Army control over a shipment. However, if it taxes the Army system too highly, its use should be reconciled to employ the preferred mode (air) in its normal time frame.

e. Reference item concerning South Beach Ammunition Operations, page 24, paragraph A(8). The request to shift a portion of the Alaska Barge & Transport Corporation capability to the North Beach has been approved.

AVCA GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

f. Reference item concerning port analysis, page 13, paragraph A(11).

(1) Shipping Agreement vessels are commercial vessels operating on a regular established trade route which is transited on a pre-determined schedule. Military cargo is booked aboard the Shipping Agreement vessel in CONUS for an RVN port which is one of the vessel's ports of call. The Shipping Agreement vessel will notify MSTS of its impending arrival 72 hours or less prior to its arrival in port. Often this is not done, however, and MSTS can only complain to the ships owners concerning the lack of arrival notification.

(2) Cam Ranh Bay has 1 ea 100 ton crane and 1 ea 60 ton crane. This is considered sufficient for the port's needs. Most vessels also have a heavy lift capability of up to 50 tons at certain hatches.

(3) The approach channel to the Ammo pier has been surveyed at more than 30 ft except in one small area which is approximately 27 ft in depth. Dredging is planned in January 70 to eliminate the shallow point and make the channel a uniform depth of 30 ft or more.

(4) The cargo documentation for a shipment originating in one RVN port en route to another RVN port is placed aboard the vessel. The POD's boarding party should pick up these documents from the vessel when they board the ship. Transit time between ports preclude mailing the required documents between ports. The teletype idea is excellent and should be pursued.

g. Reference item concerning Electric Forklift Downtime, page 26, paragraph B(1). Nonconcur. Rigging a voltmeter to monitor the battery charge level is not considered a practical solution to the problem. The 4,000 lb electric forklift battery is designed for 8 hours of operation and must be charged for a full 7 hours prior to the next 8 hours of operation. TM 10-1600A dated July 1954, outlines specific re-cycling procedures for maximizing battery charge and life. Recommend that operator and organizational maintenance personnel receive additional training concerning proper procedures for operating and maintaining the electric forklift.

h. Reference item concerning Out-of-Country Repair, page 26, paragraph B(2). Concur. The following actions have been initiated and will substantially improve those areas where shortfalls still exist.

(1) More vessels will be programmed into in-country shipyards in FY 70 compared with FY 69 but the total in-country capability is still limited.

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(2) A 1,900 ton floating dry dock is now available and will replace a 400 ton dry dock at Vinnell's Cam Ranh Bay site. This will significantly increase the contractor's capability.

(3) Saigon shipyards are being surveyed to determine what capability actually exists. Upon completion of the surveys, contracts will be let to those facilities meeting the standards.

(4) 2nd Logistical Command supervises the out-of-country overhaul program. The following improvements have been initiated by 2nd Log Comd to increase marine maintenance overhaul support:

(a) Additional marine maintenance inspectors have been hired for all overhaul sites.

(b) The Purchasing and Contracting Officer, USARYIS, has appointed COR personnel to report on the progress of marine craft repair at the overhaul sites.

(c) The repair parts supply system has been adjusted which allows for a longer lead time for procurement. In addition, the MECOM product manager has improved requisitioning procedures which will expedite procurement of critical repair parts.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous intersement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

CF:
USASUPCOM CRB
124th Trans Comd

Thomas R. High 245 AGC
200. D. STAFFORD
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

AVHGC-DST (6 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 22 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A).

2. Reference item concerning "Port Performance Analysis," section II, page 23, paragraph A(11), and 2d Indorsement, paragraph f(1); concur. Each contract for shipping agreement vessels contains a clause requiring the ship to notify the port of call 72 hours prior to arrival. As stated, MSTSO-V is continually soliciting the cooperation of the local agents representing the shipping firms for the most current information pertaining to their respective vessels. This information when received is disseminated promptly to the ports concerned.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B.A. GOODWIN
MAJ, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
124th Trans Comd
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (6 Aug 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 124th Transportation Command
(Terminal A) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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